Vital lessons from the Obama’s U-Turn on U.S. antimissile defense policy

This is why we need not to overlook the key lessons from this U-Turn amidst the raucous jubilations the decision has elicited in the Kremlin, which over the years has argued that the Iranian threats were largely exaggerated, and now proved right by the recent findings of the U.S. intelligence. Ditto in the sighs of relief generated by the decision in major NATO countries’ capitals, whose leaderships had been overtly too timid to confront George Bush’s reckless administration that abused their patience at will as he pursued the U.S.’ mainly self-centered security agenda on the geopolitical arena in the post-9/11 era.

Lessons for Poland and the Czech Republic

One of the first lessons from Obama’s decision is that truths will always prevail over lies, and that the manipulations of intelligence findings, a detested, pseudo-legal skill perfected and generously used by Bush, to drive his egocentric policies down the throats of its allies will always create more problems than solve the existing ones. This is evident in the Iraq war debacle and other questionable initiatives such as the now revoked AMS policy — which as it now turns out, had been based on hawkish, wishful thinking and imaginations of some U.S. politician, rather than authentic intelligence findings or far-reaching extrapolations made by experts from them.

The lesson for the current Polish and Czech leaders, and many others like them in Europe, is simple. Sovereignty is not built on paper declarations, whilst its longevity and strategic policies to defend it, should be built on key national interests that should not become ‘objects of sale and purchase’ to the highest bidders. In other words, any nation, irrespective of its size, ought to have its own national interests that are not ‘antipodes or declarations of love’ to some other countries.

It was clear to everyone that the Polish and Czech leaders’ readiness to host the U.S. largely untested antimissile technologies on their territories, despite the rigorous oppositions of their own citizens, was motivated not exclusively by national security requirements, but mainly to gratify the United States, whilst, at the same time, infuriating the Kremlin because of their centuries-old hatred for Russia. 

“The lesson for the current Polish and Czech leaders is simple. Sovereignty is not built on paper declarations, whilst its longevity and strategic policies to defend it, should be built on key national interests that should not become ‘objects of sale and purchase’ to the highest bidders.”

It will be difficult to find a better assessment of the Polish authorities’ behavior than that offered by former Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller, who had aptly noted that the Obama’s U-Turn has thought Poland a key lesson in real, and not provincial policy, because Washington now sees the threats to the West not from Russia, but from unreliable theocratic Islamic states, and the fact that the current Polish elite thinks otherwise is inconsequential to Washington.

This observation also applies to the other so-called ‘new’ European nations, which should desist from seeing the pursuits of their core national interests only as ‘minor appendices to the U.S. geopolitical agenda’ that should, unfailingly, be realized at the expense of Russia. Such aspirations will unvaryingly end in the same way, as the now-revoked AMS policy. 

The lessons for 'old' Europe

For the ‘older’ European states, notably, Germany, France and Britain, the lesson is that they need to be ‘much bolder’ in their interactions with their more influential transatlantic strategic ally, as they are in a much better position to let Washington know what the world thinks about its irrationally egoistic behaviors on the international arena, such as the previous plans to deploy this missile in Europe or invade Iraq on cooked-up intelligence reports.

The superlatively positive adjectives used by the leaders of these countries to describe Obama’s decision to revoke the contentious AMS policy indicated that not only were these leaders not in approval of the policy, but also the fact that they, like Russian leaders, really saw it as a dangerous step capable of restarting a precarious arms race that would not ensure better and more reliable security on the continent. 

These leaders’ failure to publicly voice their real concerns — either collectively or individually — until the policy was revoked by its author, only serves to underscore their docile role in their relationships with Washington on strategic issues. Particularly, this ‘trio’ should know that their failure to act, when they should for the benefit of mankind, is tantamount to failing in their collective international responsibilities as great independent political powers.

More importantly, both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ Europe should remember that they, being bound by the ‘famous clause’ in the NATO Accord, will have to pay high prices if their continuous silence on questionable U.S. adventurisms should provoke military reactions from other major world powers.

“For the ‘older’ European states, the lesson is that they need to be ‘much bolder’ in their interactions with their more influential transatlantic strategic ally, as they are in a much better position to let Washington know what the whole world thinks about its often irrational and egoistic behaviors on the global arena.”

The lessons for Russian leaders

For the Russians, the lesson is simple and more illustratively compelling: and that is that bona-fide democracy, which ushers in real changes in a country’s top management and core strategic policies, really pays in states with authentic democratic traditions. Specifically, this change in this controversial AMS deployment policy became possible today because of Obama’s ascension to the pinnacle of the U.S. political establishment.

In other words, this policy review would certainly have been impossible, had Bush, as in myriad of cases of imitations of true democratic practices across the world, had used his power of incumbency to manipulate the U.S. electoral system to put in the White House ‘a protege’ that would continue his globally detested policies of continuously provoking Moscow, irritating its docile NATO allies and disgusting other members of the global community. 

And, finally, the last lesson for all the current and future global leaders is the fact that Obama did not only not consider it belittling to concede his country’s obvious mistake in this divisive missile issue, but also had the human courage to revoke the policy to please core allies and potential strategic partners such as Russia. This is not a demonstration of political weakness by President Obama, but a manifestation of a far-sighted statesman’s approach to a vital policy issue that concerns all.

By this decision, the new U.S. president has once again highlighted his country’s indisputable greatness and his readiness to ‘right all the wrongs’ of the former administration as he embarks on the realization of his key election pledge of returning his country to its traditional leadership positions in global politics, shaken by the strategically fatal policy decisions and unilateralist approach to seeking solution to key world affairs by the previous administration.