Kremlin’s regime change policy ends Russia’s regional autocracies
The prevailing new political and economic realities have brought in a new era for Russia’s powerful regional political heavyweights, some of whom have been in power even before the collapse of the Soviet empire in the 1990s. Going by the recent developments, it seems the time has finally come for these ‘regional autocrats’ to step aside and let new leaders come onstage with new and fresher ideas that fully rhyme with the Kremlin’s new policy on political and socio-economic modernization of Russia.
The latest regional autocrat to go is Murtaza Rakhimov, the head of Bashkortostan for the past 20 years. Other equally high-profile regional political heavyweights recently sent on voluntary pensions, though with ‘golden parachutes’ befitting top Wall Street bankers, have included Eduard Rossel (Sverdlovsk Region), Mintimer Shaimiev (Tatarstan president), Nikolai Fyodorov (Chuvasia president), etc. The only remaining prominent figure still in power from the so-called Yeltsin’s list of era regional ‘political Colossuses’ is the influential Moscow mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, whose tenure is also being rumored to be on the line, as Kremlin searches for a worthy replacement and lucrative deal to end his almost 20-year career in the nation’s capital.
Long seen as an untouchable caste completely impermeable to political and socio-economic changes in the country, most of these leaders have ruled their regions as personal estates, controlling everything — businesses, media, resources, etc — either directly through family members or trusted loyal elites in their domains. It is therefore not uncommon, to paraphrase NGOs’ findings, that nepotism, despotism, tribalism, etc., have long replaced meritocracy in most Russian regions. This is evident in the fact that positions in public services are usually awarded on principles that hardly meet the standard definitions of meritocracy, professionalism and other basic qualities that usually qualify candidates for such high positions in other regions.
The birth of what has come to be known as ‘regional autocracy’ in post-Soviet Russia owned its origin to President Boris Yeltsin’s misguided political declaration, ‘take as much as autonomy as you can swallow,’ in his bid to secure the regional leaders’ support in his fight for more political powers in the chaotic 1990s. The regional leaders really took so much autonomy that, some like Chechen’s Johar Dudayev, later declared his republic independent of Moscow, while others similarly contemplated extricating their regions from Moscow into new and independent political entities.
Naturally, Yeltsin’s ‘generous gift of limitless autonomy’ almost led to the disintegration of post-Soviet Russia, forcing Moscow to go to war twice in late 1990s to bring Grozny back to its jurisdiction. This tough military action forced other regional leaders that had wanted to take similar moves to backslide from sure political suicides, as Vladimir Putin’s Kremlin, realizing the contagiosity of Grozny separatism, quashed all attempts by regional leaders to undermine Russia’s territorial integrity and internationally acclaimed sovereignty over its historical boundaries.
Thereafter, via the so-called ‘power vertical,’ the Kremlin and regional leaders reached a sort of a gentleman’s agreement, which has been effective till the behaviors of some of the most repugnant of the regional elites recently forced Kremlin to change the existing status quo and embark on a new policy of regime changes in regions still governed by Yeltsin’s era appointees. For one, while the outside facade of most regional leaderships bears all the hallmarks of modern-day democracy, the reality is that some of these leaders, like Rakhimov, have come to see their regions as ‘hereditary personal fiefdoms’ that can be passed from father to son like in a monarchy. For instance, several media recently aired reports, where Rakhimov’s son, Ural, almost runs Bashkortostan in such an extravagantly lavish style that makes an Arab crown prince looks like a church mouse, by comparison. The general consensus after the devastating media reports was that Rakhimov’s political clan dynasty was over.
By removing long serving regional leaders, the Kremlin has sent a clear message of where it stands on clannishness, regional autocracy, quasi-democracy, etc. This move though extremely belated, is, nevertheless, a right step in the right direction. This is because staying indefinitely in office might have its benefits, but the examples of flourishing democracies across the world have shown that limited terms in government’s top positions offer more opportunities for regional and national developments as they enable new people with fresher ideas and policy strategies to come onboard and mover their societies, nations, countries, and indeed, the whole world forward.
One can only hope that President Medvedev’s new appointees to the regions do not become mere replicates of their predecessors, but on the contrary, fully share the president’s agenda on comprehensive political reformation and socio-economic modernization of Russia.
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