Kremlin seeks mutual understanding with EU at tripartite summit

The logic behind the Kremlin’s move at the October tripartite summit in the French resort city of Deauville is that if these two European giants accept Moscow’s views on the issues tabled on the meeting’s agenda, then the rest of EU members will as has been shown by history definitely follow suit, as they usually endorse decisions sanctioned by Berlin and Paris. 

This evidently obvious position was further driven home in October, when German Chancellor Angela Merkel, defending a deal struck between Paris and Berlin on the European fiscal rules ahead of a vital EU summit, literally said nothing substantial could be done in EU without the backing of Berlin and Paris. “It is true that a Franco-German agreement is not everything in EU. But without a Franco-German agreement, not much is possible in the Union, either.” This direct quote, as experts and analysts like to say, highlights the obviousness of the unquestionable hegemony of Germany and France in EU, and hence the Kremlin’s decision to focus its attention more on this duo, rather on the entire collection of 27 states in the Union, when discussing issues of pan-continental importance, is expected to tap the duo’s indisputable omnipotence over Brussels decisions.

Indeed, it is clear that Russian leaders are becoming frustrated with EU members’ unnecessary foot dragging on key issues, whose geopolitical relevance to resolving major security issues and challenges in Europe and beyond is obvious even to the blind, and consequently, do not require further explanations to convince forward-looking national leaders to act. Take, for instance, the Kremlin’s proposal for the new pan-European security accord to replace all Cold War era’s security arrangements, including the Helsinki Treaty that had guaranteed the post-WWII sovereignty and territorial integrity of European states. All these and other post-WWII agreements in Europe have become obsolete after the fall of the Berlin Wall, denunciation of the Warsaw Pact, collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and emergence of new countries on the continent from the disintegrations of several countries and reunion of Eastern and Western Germany. 

The funny thing is that in separate meetings of Russia with EU states, all seem to agree that a new security accord is needed to reflect the new realities on the continent, but at meetings with EU as a single entity, suspicions over the Kremlin’s real motives always seem to dominate the agenda as the traditional Russophobe states in Eastern Europe and their more influential allies outside the continent always masterly hold the rest of the EU states, who support such decisions, hostage to the famous, all-binding unanimity clause in the Union’s decision-making rules.

Ditto for the Kremlin’s proposal on a visa free regime with EU member states. The Russian president has even gone ‘an extra mile’ by unilaterally making a draft of his vision of the visa-free agreement and handling it to Brussels to accelerate the debate on the issue. The intention was for the EU to review and introduce all the changes that it deems necessary to the document and the final version adopted after relevant negotiations. Again, so far there has been no progress, despite the fact that some EU states, such as Germany and Europe’s popular tourist destination countries, have on an individual basis drastically simplified their visa requirements for Russians. Full revoke of the visa regime, however, has remained elusive at the EU level. 

It is logical to attribute the EU’s hesitant stance on all Kremlin’s initiatives to fear — both real and imagined, justified and unjustified. Indeed, all the current EU states have their own different reasons for fearing the resurgent Russia’s increasing political role and economic influence on the continent. The smaller EU states, already eclipsed by other major EU states, such as Germany and France, do not want a third master to report in the Union. Such sentiments are especially strong among the recently liberated Eastern European countries, whose memories of sub-human treatments under the Kremlin-led communist dominance of the Eastern bloc in the Cold War era are still fresh today. 

Similarly, for EU’s largest political and economic nations, notably, Germany and France, Russia, the largest nation on the continent, in terms of size of population and landmass, and its huge natural resources, notably gas and oil, obviously represents some form of real threats, as it can easily ‘dilute these giants’ economic hegemony on the continent, if it can put its house in order and starts to more effectively leverage all its obvious economic and geographical competitive advantages. So, every EU member has both nationalistic reasons and other considerations to hinder, if not totally to derail, the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to playing a more influential role in post-Cold War Europe. 

One of the ways of achieving this is keeping Russia away from pan-European, post-Cold War organizations and/or obstructing reformations of the old post-WWII institutions that will reflect the new political changes and economic realities on the continent. This is why it is difficult not to agree with Vladimir Chizhov, the Russian ambassador to EU, when he said that the key factors hindering the total abolition of the visa regime and seeing Russia’s objective view on the need for a new security arrangement in Europe are due to ‘certain nationalistic and other hidden geopolitical considerations’ by certain EU member states that are very far from the main items on the Moscow and Brussels’ joint agenda. 

One of these is Brussels’ stance that it will consider a visa-free regime with Russia only after it has established the same policy with members of its so-called Eastern Partnership, a group of six states, including Ukraine and Georgia. Another reason is the unjustified fear that after revoking the visa regime that Russian emigrants will overwhelm EU states with crimes and other anti-social behaviors. However, Chizov, parrying off all these arguments, noted that he does not think Russia represents a greater threat for EU than other 50 countries, whose citizens already enjoy a visa-free regime or other preferential visa status with EU states. 

It seems that Medvedev made some progress at the Deauville meeting, with French President Nicolas Sarkozy tentatively promising a sort of ‘road map’ that could eventually lead to a visa free regime in 10 years’ time, while German Chancellor Angela Merkel noted Medvedev’s decision to attend the NATO summit in Lisbon in November, saying such a step will help elevate Russia-NATO cooperation to a new level. More importantly, however, is the two EU leaders’ declared support for the Kremlin’s proposal for a new security accord in Europe that will enhance more effective resolutions of conflicts on the continent. 

It is now left for Paris and Berlin to sell their positive views on Russia’s proposals to their EU partners, and convince them that all stand to gain by teaming up as a entity, rather as individuals with Russia, and there is more danger in treating Russia as a stranger, or worse still, relating to it as a potential enemy in the common European house. This is why the French, German and Russian leaders’ decision to continue future meetings in this tripartite format means that this troika has decided to jointly tackle common European issues and challenges on a more serious note for the benefit of the entire continent.