Putin’s absolutization of incumbency powers nullifies his rivals' chances for the Russian presidency
After the Dec. 4, 2011 parliamentary election, which most of the population said was grossly falsified by the authorities in favor of United Russia (UR), a pro-Kremlin party headed by Vladimir Putin, the country’s powerful prime minister and former president from 2000 to 2008, the Russian electorate return again to the polling booths on March 4, 2012, this time to choose a new head of state that will rule their country for the next six years.
There was never any doubt in and outside Russia that incumbent prime minister would comfortably win what would really be his third term in the Kremlin as the nation’s new president in the March 4 election. Therefore, the exit poll results and the first preliminary official figures that handed him over 60% of the votes cast in the first round — almost over 40 points ahead of his nearest rival — were not surprising to both supporters in United Russia (UR), a pro-Kremlin party, loyal to the prime minister, and his uncompromising antagonists, as these figures virtually reflected all the public opinion surveys conducted in the country prior to the election. The real question was, and still remains, the constitutionality, fairness and legality of this seemingly landslide victory, given the Kremlin’s blatant and generous use of the so-called ‘administrative resources’ to thwart real and fair competition as it lopsidedly supported its candidate in a way that basically left the other contenders without any real chances of winning the presidency.
Apart from Putin, the other contenders for the nation’s highest political office, in order of candidates’ probabilities of success and popularity among the nation’s eligible electorate, were Gennady Zyuganov, the long-serving chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the head of the populist nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). Others included Just Russia Party (JRP) head Sergei Mironov, who also once doubled as the Russian Senate chairman till he was dethroned on political grounds in 2011, and finally, business mogul Mikhail Prokhorov, the flamboyant multibillionaire owner of the Onexim Group with stakes in blue chip corporations in and outside Russia, including most of the country’s gold and nickel outputs, and other interests as diverse as nanotechnology, a hybrid car manufacturing and the New Jersey Nets Basketball Club, an NBA franchise. Unlike the other contenders, the billionaire debuted as a presidential candidate in the March 4 poll.
However, the issue of a favorite at the March 4 polls became almost irrelevant last September, when the incumbent president, Dmitry Medvedev — personally handpicked by Putin in late 2007 as his replacement in the Kremlin due to a constitutional ban on a third consecutive term — voluntarily relinquished his power of incumbency to seek a legally justified second term on a very flimsy ground of his ‘diminished popularity, compared with that of his political patron and mentor.’
A new political reality
Prior to the contested parliamentary election results, the key question was the scale of the margin of Putin’s expected landslide victory at the poll. But with the results of the parliamentary election that showed a marked nationwide decline in support for the URP, Putin’s political base, the probability of a possible second round ballot is no longer a far-fetched hypothetical idea, as most independent poll results currently predict that no candidate, including the mighty prime minister, can secure an outright victory in the first round in a free and fair election.
“The issue of a favorite at the polls became almost irrelevant last September, when the incumbent president voluntarily relinquished his constitutional power of incumbency to seek a legally justified second term on a very flimsy ground of his ‘diminished popularity.’”
The discontent with the parliamentary election results reflects the new reality prevailing in the country, evident in the escalation of protest moods and sentiments across the country. Specifically, the citizens, unsatisfied with the parliamentary election results, have been regularly organizing massive street protests and other forms of public demonstrations, the latest round of which took place on February 4. As one of the official measures to restore public trust in the nation’s electoral system, the government installed web cameras in all the polling stations nationwide capable of conducting online coverage of the events in the polling stations during the March 4 election. This Internet portal, www.webvybory2012.ru, created at an astronomical cost of about 13bln rubles, was successfully trial tested in February and declared fully combat ready to play the role of an electronic watchdog during the presidential election.
All these new developments have led to a situation, where even Putin, the erstwhile runaway favorite, is no longer so certain of a first-round victory, as he has already declared his readiness to take part in a possible second round of balloting, if no candidate is able to secure an outright victory — constitutionally defined as a benchmark of 50% plus one vote of the total ballots cast — in the first round. “There is nothing wrong with a second round of voting. I'm ready for it, and if necessary, I will take part in the second round,” Putin said.
Putin’s huge administrative resources at work
Putin’s readiness to participate even in the run-off means that he is certain of eventually securing the majority of the electorate’s mandate to become Russia’s next president — either in the first or in second round of voting — because of the unique peculiarities of the Russian electoral system that lopsidedly favor incumbent government officials running for electable offices in the country. In other words, the prime minister’s confidence is based on his so-called power of incumbency, the real powerbroker in Russia, as he never actually fully relinquished all the presidential powers to Medvedev, and secondly, because of his direct access to the so-called ‘administrative resources,’ which means a generous use of the state’s bureaucratic, mass media, financial, economic, political and social policy tools to securing the necessary outcome of any balloting. These vast resources are at Putin’s beck and call, whilst the same cannot be said of his political rivals to the Kremlin’s top post, who are brazenly denied of such resources.
One of the manifestations of the government’s use of these administrative resources in favor of Putin is the policy on freezing price hikes on utility bills till July 1, though in the past, such hikes traditionally went into effect on January 1, a measure that never went well with the citizens, who have tagged such price hikes the Kremlin’s ‘negative New Year gifts.’ By postponing this policy, the government removed a major source of social discontent, though it cited its ongoing fight against inflation as the real economic rationale behind the move.
“To get a perspective on the magnitude of the financial implications of Putin’s extravagantly generous election promises, some investment banks have computed and extrapolated the total cost of implementing both earmarked and yet-to-specified projects at trillions of rubles.”
Similarly, according to the media airtime metrics released in February, the five presidential contenders received a total of 55 hours of broadcasting time in the state-owned or affiliated electronic mass-media outlets. Of this, Putin received a total of 23 hours, while the other four aspirants received an average of eight hours each. Besides, Putin, while deciding against engaging in public debates on key issues of national and international importance with his political rivals for the presidency — a marked disrespect for the electoral process and the citizens deprived of the opportunities of seeing the prime minister answering really tough questions, instead of well-orchestrated and mildly phrased questions from allies and supporters — has chosen to communicate with the electorate via the press. Specifically, he has published several multipage articles in some of the nation’s most influential newspapers, covering subjects, ranging from ethnic and national issues to topics such as democracy, nation building, reforms of the economy, business and legal and judiciary procedures, amongst others. Other candidates have yet to obtain similar blanket coverage and programs analyses in those media.
Besides, Putin, as prime minister, also generously enjoys free media coverage, whenever he appears for official functions that are not always and necessarily connected with the ongoing electoral campaigns. This is called the ‘collateral positive electoral benefit’ from the power of incumbency enjoyed by ruling political leaders formally performing official functions at election times. It, therefore, is not very surprising that the frequencies of such official events have seen a geometrical increase in recent months, especially as the role of the lame-docked incumbent president has become increasingly marginalized by the prime minister’s election team in favor of highlighting their election’s flag bearer at every possible opportunity. For obvious reasons, his political rivals could not be given similar privileges.
In another instance heavily laden with political dividends, Putin moved in to use the government’s money to save Lanta Tour Voyage, the now notoriously popular firm that suddenly went bankrupt in January, leaving thousands of Russian tourists stranded at the domestic, foreign airports and hotels, leaning on the VTB Group, a state-owned bank, to grant a generous $7mln credit line for the cash-starved company. Similarly, speaking at the high-profile Russia-2012 Investment Forum, Putin also requested VTB to redeem the stakes held by the so-called participants of the ‘People’s IPOs’ at a rate that is currently twice their present market prices, a move, which, according to most conservative estimates, will cost the government at least 20bln rubles. Besides, Putin was the chief guest speaker at this forum, while the other presidential aspirants were on record for their stark absence or received a comparatively much lower profile at the event, attended by ‘who is who’ in the Russian and international investment communities.
There are also similar policies for the aviation, energy, agro and other key sectors of the Russian economy. In other words, the government has pledged trillions of rubles to short-, medium- and long-term projects that are likely to entice workers in those industries to tie their futures with Putin, and consequently, make or force them to vote for him on March 4. For instance, in the aviation industry, Putin has tasked national carriers — Aeroflot and Transaero airlines — to transport Russian football fans free-of-charge to support the national soccer team at the Euro Football Championship-2012 that will be co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine this summer. This gesture, which also carries a price tag of several millions of rubles, will surely endear the Kremlin’s candidates to both these airlines workers and millions of football fans across the country.
To get a perspective on the magnitude of the financial implications of Putin’s election promises, some investment banks have computed and extrapolated the cost of implementing earmarked projects. And so, according to experts, only in the social sphere, Putin promised to send a total of more than 5.1trln. rub. per year, and if all the promises in all the sectors of the economy, including the already declared, but yet-to-be specified purposes, then the resulting figure will be in tens or even in hundreds of trillions of rubles.
“While the other contenders could only promise what they hoped to do if they eventually win the presidency, Putin was already disbursing the state’s financial resources in a spending spree reminiscent of Arab sheiks’ consumerism.”
Even multibillionaire Prokhorov, with his vast financial empire’s cash-load, estimated by Forbes magazine at $22.7bln in 2011, would find it both exhaustingly extravagant and absolutely impossible to match Putin’s economic generosity across sectors of the Russian economy cash for cash. While the other contenders could only promise what they hoped to do if they eventually win the presidency, Putin was already disbursing the state’s financial resources for the realization of his programs outlined in the Strategy-2020. As the local Russian saying goes, the differences are self-evidently clear.
Perennial Kremlin contenders under Prokhorov’s criticism
Indeed, the other presidential aspirants — Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky and Mironov — who have been regular contenders for the Kremlin post in the past decades, either offered their same old policies previously rejected by the electorate in the past polls, or their new, upgraded versions that have taken into consideration the current economic situations at home and broad as well as the new political and socio-economic realities in today’s Russia after the State Duma election.
The only new ideas on the future vision of a new Russia came from Prokhorov, who so far can count himself really lucky to gain a spot on the presidential ballot against all odds, as ex-Yukos oil corporation owner Mikhail Khodorkovksy, the only oligarch to previously envision entering Russian politics, is currently languishing in jail on questionable economic violation charges, a move that has quenched other oligarchs’ quest for political powers in the country since 2003, when the oligarch was arrested. “My economic programs will be aimed at creating equal opportunities that will enable all Russians to reach the heights of their goals in accordance with their talents and handwork,” he added. “Our country’s biggest problem is the lack of competition in all aspects of public life; therefore, my main goal is to cultivate active competition in politics and businesses.”
The only issue that was bothering Putin, his supporters and foes was why the prime minister, who de-facto has now been in power for almost 12 years with an almost monopolistic iron control over every facet of the country’s life, could not solve the problems highlighted in his official speeches and newspaper articles. For instance, Prokhorov highlighted this issue in his criticisms of the presidential political manifestoes of his rival contenders for the Kremlin’s top post in one of his interviews. Thus, condemning Zyuganov’s program, which has made renationalization of all the illegally privatized state’s assets in the energy and other business sectors the cornerstone of his manifesto, Prokhorov called such policies “strategies of bygone days and the worst manifestation of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine.”
Similarly, the multibillionaire-turned-politician also dismissed the presidential programs of LDPR’s Zhirinovsky and JRP’s Mironov as ‘colorful and highly unrealistic populist slogans’ that are completely out of touch with today’s Russian political, economic and social realities. Notably, Mironov came under the oligarch’s fire for calling for increasing rents on natural resources, levying huge luxury taxes on the nation’s superrich citizens, re-visitation of the economic concept of ‘People’s Corporation,’ where every worker is a shareholder in his/her company, as well as execution of radical tax reforms to close the gaping legal loopholes and off-shore business holdings that encourage tax evasions, etc. Likewise, disqualifying Putin’s electoral programs, Prokhorov called them ‘a continuation of the same ill-conceived policies that are exemplary in their complete incapability to catalyze an accelerated rate of national development or set aggressively ambitious targets for the economy and the nation as whole.’
“One of the biggest negative consequences of the existing political status quo in Russia is the fact that it is wreaking serious damage on the country, as it deprives its citizens of the opportunity to enjoy the benefits and civilized values of modern democracy in the 21st century.”
However, in refuting these charges, Putin noted that his failure so far to solve his country’s perennial problems stemmed from the fact that either there were other more critical issues at the top of his agenda or there were simply no required resources to effectively tackle them. “But today, the situation has changed. Our topmost priority is to bring to a logical conclusion the task that I have started — notably, the creation of such a state mechanism and socio-economic system that will be a vibrant healthy organism, capable of guaranteeing, first and foremost, Russia’s sovereignty, whilst at the same time, be dynamic enough to be able to always proactively respond to the changing times and challenges, and thus guarantee our citizens’ living standards.”
In conclusion, it must be noted that the odds against Putin’s contenders for the Kremlin are so huge that their probabilities of success at the poll are, mathematically speaking, infinitesimally small. It is, therefore, not surprising that these candidates expressed their joint indignation over the use of ‘administrative resources’ in February at a State Duma session, but their voices of protest were drowned out the by the lower chamber’s majority, consisting of so-called ‘Putin's deputies’ from the United Russia Party faction. This reality was highlighted by one political observer, when he erroneously said in his commentary that Russia would be voting for Putin as its next president on March 4. This statement, though evidently a mistake of tongue, vividly epitomizes the unique peculiarities of the Russian electoral system, the absolutisation of power of incumbency and the vastness of the Kremlin’s so-called administrative resources to secure and guarantee a desired outcome of any electoral process in Russia.
The existence of this questionable status quo today, naturally, benefits only the political elite and its affiliated representatives of the oligarchy, who only think only about the safety of their capital, rather than about the fate of their country. The biggest negative outcome is that this status quo is wreaking serious damage on the country, as it deprives its citizens of the opportunity to enjoy all the benefits, privileges and true values of modern democracy, a reality that is not very good for today’s Russia, one of the leading European states, especially in the 21st century.
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