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Ambitious Putin begins his hard-won de-facto third term in Kremlin

Author: Inga Friedelhaus Section: Politics

Issue: June 2012, Vol.7, No.6

Tags: Putin

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For Vladimir Putin, the nation’s most powerful statesman, the distance from Russian premiership to Russian presidency has always been just a step away, the small step he finally took on May 7 during his de-facto third term inauguration in the Grand Kremlin Palace. That same step finally ended a very difficult four-year period of his premiership in the framework of the artificially created neologistic ‘tandemocracy’ in terms of his political career and personal ambitions.

It was difficult because ‘tandemocracy’ in Russia, which has a super-presidential administrative structure, meant that Putin, the nation’s most powerful and popular public officer, was formally forced to play, at least, the role of a ‘second fiddle’ in the official Russian government hierarchy, whist Dmitry Medvedev, the less popular politician ran, at least, formally the country as the head of state.

The fact that Medvedev was able to conclude the only single presidential term originally allocated to him in such a fragile political structure, and also the fact that there was no constitutional shift of powers in favor of the prime minister in the past four years, only highlighted the ability of the “senior partner in the tandem” to keep his promise.

As no knew how key decisions were taken in the Kremlin under Medvedev, one can only assume that this was done collectively, and the issue of who usually got the upper hand in the decision-making processes is irrelevant, as all the adopted resolutions were finally endorsed by the president to become laws. And those still doubting the equal participation of Medvedev in the “tandem’s affairs” or those, who claim that the tandem’s ‘center of gravity’ was lopsided in favor of Putin, must provide, as Russians like to say, such evidence.

However, such a construction of a bi-pivotal power structure with the blurred boundaries of duties and responsibilities, which is based on what Medvedev had called personal and informal relations bonded by a “special chemistry” between the duumvirate, simply could not continue longer than the four years allotted to the former president. In this context, the May 7 inauguration formally returned the previous, more familiar status quo to the Russian political hierarchy, and for the triumphant Putin, it marked the beginning of his third presidential term in the Kremlin.

Fashionable political neologisms: “Putin.2, Updated Putin or Putin Upgrade”

Describing the “Kremlin’s political jobs castling,” which saw the ex-president becoming the prime minister, and vice-versa, Russian Cabinet’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov, consciously or not, coined a succinct neologism, “Updated Putin,” to characterize the third return of his boss to the Kremlin as a leader with new programs for developing Russia over the next six years, and perhaps and for even 12 years or more.

“For Putin, the past four years were for very difficult, because, despite being the nation’s most powerful man, he was formally forced to play, at least, the role of a ‘second fiddle’ in the official power hierarchy.”

This is not a hypothetical issue, as 11% of respondents in the Levada Center survey do not exclude such a perspective, saying that Putin can “rule Russia as long as he wants.” Only 38% of the respondents believe the current term will be his last, while an almost the same number thinks he will rule the country till 2024.

The term, “New Putin,” has become a kind of an innovative label for the president, which is now called, by analogy with the newer versions of IT products as “Putin.2”, “Upgraded Putin,” etc. "The new Putin knows what to do in his third term as president; understands where he is going, what to do, when, and with whom,” said Peskov, presenting the “upgraded Putina.2” on Channel One.

The manner reflected those once frequently used by Apple’s ex-president Steve Jobs or Microsoft Corp. founder Bill Gates in his early youth while presenting their revolutionary innovative products to the global community. “Putin has returned to the Kremlin for a third time to develop Russia both physically and spiritually,” Peskov noted. “His first term was dedicated to the ‘reanimation’ of Russia, his second term to its ‘rehabilitation’ and the third will be dedicated to its physical and spiritual development.”

This raises the main question: how really transformed is Putin, and how possible, if at all, is it for a person to radically change his life philosophy in the second half of his life. And besides, “Putin.2” has returned to the Kremlin in a politically transformed country, much different from the state undermined by numerous crises and contradictions, which he inherited from Boris Yeltsin in the late 1990s.

How will the new Putin react to new trends in domestic and foreign policies, what tools will he work, his old traditional ones or new, innovative methodologies? There are lots of questions begging for answers, but the answers are not so obvious. But since we are not telepathists, we cannot foresee how a "renewed Putin" will behave in certain situations in the future. But we have known the "old version" of Putin, or using IT terminology, "Putin.1", now for almost 15 years since he relocated from St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak’s administration to the Old Square in Moscow in the mid-1990s.

This period is enough for someone to be able to predict Putin’s possible behavior in similar circumstances, or what types of actions to expect from him. But

how will "Putin.2" act in an environment that is completely new to him? These are all vital questions that raise concerns both among his fiercest supporters as well as his uncompromising opponents, who have continued to publicly and noisily demonstrate their denunciation of his third presidential term as illegal.

There are lots of questions beginning for straightforward answers

The tandem is not used to getting its ways without even bothering to explain the rationale behind their actions to the Russian people. For example, how did the duo explain the need for their jobs castling, and also the fact that there are no other qualified persons in a country with a population of 145mln worthy to lead the state, except for the two of them?

They did not explain. For instance, Medvedev offered what looked like an explanation a week after his official statement that he would not seek a second term because of “a poorer rating.” Similarly, Putin did not even deem it necessary to explain his position to fellow citizens, but instead, to the Chinese audience. Speaking to the Beijing-based media, Putin said his decision to return to the Kremlin was dictated by a desire to “strengthen the system of state governance” in Russia.

These two explanations are full of glaring inconsistencies, as if these two gentlemen, by the way, lawyers by education, have, to put it mildly, give "false evidence" or explained two different phenomena. The Chinese journalists, accustomed to working in a country ‘with tightly controlled media,’ where questions that have not been authorized by the state leadership are not publicly asked, declined to ask Putin if his statement means that "the system of state governance” has been weakened under Medvedev?

Although, such clarification, especially for any experienced interviewer working in a country with a free press, would have been the next question to ask. Hence a recap of the question overlooked by Chinese: was the main reason for the Kremlin jobs castling caused by Medvedev’s poor rating or by Putin's urgent desire to ‘strengthen public administration’? If we assume the latter to be true, as it looks the more authentic, then this means a negative assessment of Medvedev’s job in the Kremlin. And, if this is so, then why did Medvedev so calmly react to such an embarrassing assessment of his work in public by his ‘senior partner in the tandem.’ Russians don’t know the answer because the duumvirate has not even bothered to explain these to their citizens.

One more discrepancy: if Putin was forced, in his own words, to return to the Kremlin to strengthen the “state governance system,” then from where did the press secretary get his grandiloquent expression that "Putin's third term will be devoted to physical and spiritual development of Russia?" This raises another justified question: does Putin have real, well-documented programs, a kind of a "road map" to lead Russia into a new and prosperous future, like the leaders of the Russian Communist Party, LDPR and Just Russia.

Or does “the irreplaceable father of the nation” only have beautiful declarations of intentions and extensive pre-election articles about the acute problems facing Russia, and ways to resolve them? This question is still right on the agenda and begging for answers because the Russian electorate was not provided with any programs before the election.

Putin himself did not see it necessary to participate in pre-election political debate, one of the main attributes of modern democracy that has been traditionally ignored by the powers that be in Russia since the Yeltsin’s era. In the absence of clearly documented programs with clear-cut targets, it is difficult to expect something, and even harder still to hold anyone accountable for unfilled promises, or to assess achievements or failures in six years’ time.

How Putin would behave in unfamiliar situations is a big puzzle, even for experts

The third problem is Putin's probable actions in a new terrain, for example, an onset of an acute crisis in the country or elsewhere across the globe. Or in dealing with challenges in the new geopolitical situation of growing economic instability in continental Europe, decline of the U.S. previously unchallenged domination of global affairs, a gradual but steady shift of the center of the post-crisis global economic activities to Asia led by China.

“Only time and Putin’s actions will tell if he, in his third return to the Kremlin, has really changed or everything has remained the same, as usual is only an imitation of real changes and non-existing reality.”

Answers to these straightforward questions have yet to be seen, as Putin has never been a president in times of global economic crises or in conditions of falling oil prices in a lopsidedly raw materials-based economy. These negative developments characterized the presidencies of Yeltsin and Medvedev. In contrast, Putin’s first two terms occurred in a period, when the prices of the "black gold", the nation’s main "petrodollars" earner, were at historically high levels, and this gave him all the financial resources to implement his agenda without resorting to the West or its affiliated financial institutions with outstretched hands.

That was what Yeltsin had to do in the mid-1990s, when he often had to accept some humiliating concessions on vital geopolitical issues in exchange for the next tranche of funds from the IMF, World Bank, etc. Putin’s previous two terms, in terms of external economic conditions, were especially favorable for his economic policies, and by extrapolation, for the whole country, except, perhaps, for a couple of oligarchs.

Thanks to the abundance of oil dollars, all the state’s social obligations were fully funded in the country for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union; incomes soared, and with them came an improvement in citizens’ lives. This is the root of the much-vaunted stability and prosperity that have become the hallmarks of his first and second terms of presidency, which he often compares and contrasts with the wild era of the 1990s.

Now, Russia is poised to see Putin not as an anticrisis prime minister, where the new president, in his own words, "did a perfect job fighting the crisis in the economy", but as a president in crisis times. If we proceed from the postulate of the opposition, there is nothing good to expect from "Putin.2". But if such reaction is expected, the general opinion of the so-called liberals is, however, no less radical. “The Kremlin’s power castling has killed all the hope for structural reforms, as Putin has squandered public trust, whilst his third term will be characterized by fighting with falling public ratings,” said Mikhail Dmitriev, the director of the Center for Strategic Research, one of the authors of the reform programs for Putin in the early 2000.

As a member of the famous Expert Group that drafted the economic programs for Putin's first term in 2000-04, Dmitriev’s evaluation of and expectations from "Putin.2" are worth taking seriously. "The probability of the current serious situation deteriorating into full-blown political crisis has become much higher after the duumvirate’ jobs castling. In such situation, it is difficult to expect any concerted effort to reform institutional structure, because the Kremlin’s resources will be focused on struggling and how to survive in the new political environs.”

Dmitriev dismissed the “Strategy-2020” as a part of a process that now has little or no room for further reforms in the country. “The citizens are waiting for a sign from the top for the full liberalization of the country. But if this does not happen, then public demand for change will rise from the bottom,” he added. “Any attempts to artificially block this process will cause a sharp backlash and further radicalization of not only the opposition, but also the most economically active part of the population,” he noted. "If the current level of discontent for the authority is maintained, this dissatisfaction will require at most between 12-18 months to be transformed into a full political crisis, the expert said.

Airing similar sentiment, Aleksander Dugin, the leader of the International Eurasian Movement, also does not expect anything good from Putin’s current third term, but for totally different reasons. “Of course, we are on the threshold of hard times. Putin’s third term in the Kremlin will not be ‘problems-free, as were his previous two. This is because after castling, the tandem has now assumed a very different ideological taint,” he noted.

The expert said most critics and citizens see Medvedev as ‘man of change’ and Putin as the personification of the current status quo and rejection of calls for drastic changes. The citizens do not even believe that Putin, even in his updated version, is capable of changing or doing things in a different way, he added. “The first signs of polarization among ordinary citizens and the elite in relation to the tandem started to appear during Medvedev's presidency, but today, the situation has become more visisble, and this will require Putin to reposition himself.”

Another specificity of Putin’s third term is that most of the business elite have ostracized themselves from politics, stopped commenting on the events in the country, including even those concerning their core businesses. Even former presidential candidate, multibillionaire business tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov, who immediately after the elections, had promised to create a new political party, has suddenly abandoned the idea. Against this background, the comment from Sergei Petrov, a State Duma legislator and the owner of the Rolf Group of Companies, is a proof of courage, presence of civic position and willingness to accept the responsibility for one’s actions and the fate of one’s country.

Thus, in response to the question of ‘what to expect from Putin's third term,’ he said concisely: "Nothing." As an explanation, he noted that, despite Putin's promise to improve the business climate in the country, the situation has only gone worse, because the president’s understanding of economics is suited for the 20th, and not 21st century. "The current government is the most unprofessional in the past 20 years because it comprises people with military and secret services backgrounds that often block the opportunities for taking the necessary decisions. All the attempts to change this status quo have always resulted in the increase of power and influence by the bureaucracy.”

All of this suggests that “Putin.2” will face a great dilemma. After all, even his most loyal supporters are not expecting anything from him, except for the opportunity to preserve the current status quo and the much-vaunted stability. Put simply, this category of people is just happy with the fact that Putin has finally returned to the Kremlin after a four-year-stint in the White House.

But the opposition, a priori, does not believe in him, or in his declarations of intent, because they believe his election to a de-facto third presidential term is “null and void,” and consequently, it does not expect anything other than the worst from him.

In this situation, it will be extremely difficult, even for the highly experienced Putin, to rule the new transformed Russia. Hence, the last constellation of more rhetorical questions: Is Putin ready to work in this new atmosphere, will he will act in a mild or severe way, when confronted with new challenges, what means and tools will he employ, who will be his allies — both domestic and foreign — in addressing both old, traditional Russian problems and unusual and new ones, etc.

Putin’s answers to these and other questions will determine the nature of his third term and its place in modern political history of post-Soviet Russia. Only time and his actions will tell if he, in his third return to the Kremlin, has really changed or everything will remain, as usual, only an imitation of real changes and non-existing reality.