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Putin at his best as his cabinet reshuffle relocates key allies to the Kremlin

Author: Christopher Kenneth Section: Editorials

Issue: June 2012, Vol.7, No.6

Tags: Putin

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Two weeks after his inauguration for a de-facto third term in the Kremlin and speculations over the personnel composition of the new government, President Vladimir Putin finally assembled a cabinet for his Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev. Notably, the president placed his closest allies in key positions, thus cementing his full control over the government, whilst loyal bureaucrats sacked from the previous cabinet were handed more lucrative portfolios in the Kremlin.

The secret manner of forming the new cabinet, the unclear criteria for handling out portfolios to ministers and the deliberate ostracization of the appointment procedures from public scrutiny bear the distinct classical signature hallmarks of Putin and his long-standing ‘modus operandi’ in his Kremlin’s HR policies. Indeed, there are just too many unclear issues with the cabinet and its composition. Take, for instance, the personality of Vladimir Medinsky, the nation’s new culture minister. This appointment shocked the nation and media commentators that have dug up some of the new minister’s quotes which show his farness from cultural issues.

Another issue is the fact the cabinet has been charged with fostering faster economic growth, a good objective. However, the deliberate juxtaposition of growth-focused, economic-reformers, such as Arkady Dvorkovich and Igor Shuvalov, in the White House with hardened bureaucrats known for their blatant antagonism for any reforms in the Kremlin to oversee economic policies has already turned the declared objective into “a mission impossible.”

The third ramification of the cabinet reshuffle that has also baffled the general public is the sacking of some ministers, deemed by political experts and the society as a whole as total failures in their jobs, and hence unqualified to hold any public posts, from the Medvedev’s presidential era cabinet. But true to type and his long-standing policy of “never discarding loyal allies,” Putin handed these bureaucrats more lucrative posts in the Kremlin. This begs the rationale behind the logic of sacking ministers seen by the society as completely unfit for any public office, but only to relocate them to the Kremlin with more administrative powers.

Besides, the choices of some ministers in the new cabinet have also defied common logic. And, this brings to mind the recent appointment of Igor Kholmanskikh the Kremlin’s representative in the Urals Federal District. That is the Urals military factory worker that had publicly volunteered to bring ‘some real macho Urals guys’ to help Putin fight the antigovernment protests in Moscow in a live TV call-in. This office, as one of the key pillars of the Kremlin’s so-called ‘strong power vertical’ carries real weight, political and economic leverages to influence the lives of millions of citizens.

This post was just handed down as a form of ‘public gratuity’ to this factory worker that has never held any prior public office for his unalloyed loyalty to the Kremlin and blatant disregard for Russians’ constitutional rights for public gatherings that he had avowed to disperse with impunity. It goes, without saying, that this Putin’s loyalist, now empowered by the Kremlin, and with his “macho guys still intact and ready for actions,” will not tolerate any public protests – both sanctioned and unsanctioned – on the territory placed under his watch.

Besides, the Kholmanskikh appointment has also highlighted one traditional feature of Putin’s HR policy that has always envisaged placing an emphasis on absolute loyalty at the expense of professionalism, relevant qualifications and other job eligibility criteria. This became nakedly evident at the announcement of Kholmanskikh appointment, when the media, and even the Kremlin itself, did not have the traditional relevant biographical data and past public jobs to buttress his eligibility to the post, apart from his raucous anti-constitutional calls to disperse legal gatherings of citizens as a proof of demonstration of his unalloyed loyalty to Putin.

The uniqueness of this appointment is further underscored by the fact that the Kremlin’s representatives in the other seven districts were either previous governors or had held other high-ranking offices in federal and regional government agencies. In the Kremlin’s logic, the new appointees’ unalloyed loyalty to Putin overwhelmingly overshadowed all the other vital eligibility requirements for such high-ranking posts. Common logic would have required Putin and his HR team to find more qualified candidates for some posts, and appoint “the Kremlin’s young ambitious, but highly inexperienced loyalists” as deputies to learn the act of public governance, instead of handling such “green bureaucrats” huge offices, where they will certainly have to experiment with lives and fates of millions of citizens.

With all respects for Kholmanskikh as a person and, probably, as a distinguished worker as head of one of several departments at his tanks building factory, as well as his glowing eloquence as a public orator, one, however, cannot help but doubt his professional eligibility to the post of the head of a federal district that has to oversee several governors and coordinate the Kremlin’s policies in a region that is several times bigger the territories of several European countries combined. As famous Russian political observer Dmitry Oreshkin recently put it, Putin has again demonstrated his utter disregard for citizens, the fact that he is totally in charge of events and, therefore, can appoint whomever he likes to any post that he wants, irrespective of what the citizens think about them.

Another issue is the secrecy that surrounded the entire appointment process. This was clearly displayed at one of the several meetings between the president and his prime minister that preceded the cabinet official announcement. During this the latter, often wrongly portrayed as a more liberal and reform-focused part of the tandem, said, “I have already shortlisted candidates for ministerial posts, but I would not disclose their identities so as not to trigger public discussions and scrutiny.” Needless to say, that these antidemocratic logic and anti-public reasoning mentality were fully accepted by Putin.

In the tandem’s logic, and much in line with their long-established policy in relationship to citizens, this deliberate ostracization of the society from scrutinizing the candidacies of public officials that will rule every facet of the country’s life in the next six years fully meets the Kremlin’s ongoing imitation of democratic practices such as holding ‘allegedly free and fair elections, protection of human right, independence of the judiciary, press and freedom of speech.’

It was the same argument – of not subjecting policies to public scrutiny – has been frequently used by the tandem to shield their policies from citizens. Examples include such cases, when Putin in 2004, and later Medvedev in 2008, and Putin again in 2012, refused to disclose their presidential manifestos or take part in public presidential debates so as to avoid, in their words, ‘unwanted public scrutiny of our programs.’ In other words, the programs allegedly aimed at improving citizens’ lives were hidden from their scrutiny, or were asked to believe in them as a matter of religious faith. This is nothing, but a manifestation of crude cynicism towards one’s citizens.

Such behavior underscores the fact the fact that the tandem does not see the citizens as constitutionally justified co-shareholders of stakes in the Russian government. From here it is clear that Putin has assembled this cabinet, first and foremost, for himself and his core inner circle of most loyal allies, and only at a distant second as a means for serving the citizens. Besides, the populace’s constitutional needs and legal yearning for a modern European state with a transparent and corruption-free government and really functioning democratic institutions will only receive attention of the ruling elite, only if such aspirations do not run counter to those of the president or his allies.

All this underscores the stark reality that Putin and his policies will not change in his third return to the Kremlin, as had already been clearly demonstrated by the composition of the cabinet and other high-ranking appointments. It also highlights the fact that the more “seemingly changed Putin portrays himself to be, the more starkly he remains the same old and unchangeable politician.” C’est la vie, as the French would say in such situations, a phrase that Russians would have to get used to over the next six or even more years of Putin’s reign.