Russia and US to cut nuclear stockpiles and boost cooperation in other spheres
After a protracted stalemate in bilateral negotiations on key issues that have of recent become a serious threat to the existing architecture of contemporary global security and the nuclear capacity parity status between Moscow and Washington, the Kremlin and White House have finally signed a new framework agreement on the terms for reducing their dangerous Cold War-era stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons.
If and when eventually signed into a formal, legally binding document, the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will oversee the lowest level of nuclear armaments ever agreed upon by Russia and United States since embarking on the mutually destructive, zero-sum policies on nuclear issues in the 1960s, which dominated their roller-coaster interactions till the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union ended the antagonism in the early 1990s.
Specifically, the tentative framework agreement penned on the first day of Obama’s three-day visit from July 6-8, envisages drastic reductions of both countries’ nuclear warheads from the current 2,200 units to between 1,500 and 1,675 and their delivery vehicles from 1,600 to between 500 and 1,100 units. More concrete figures will be reached during subsequent negotiations that will precede the penning of the final agreement before the end of the year, both presidents said. The new legally binding treaty will run for 10 years.
Delivery on the ‘reset button’ promise
It needs to be noted here that this tentative agreement on the new START was the first concrete step taken by both Russia and the United States since U.S. President Barack Obama declared his intent to ‘reset’ the tense bilateral relationships between the two super nuclear nations. Indeed, both the Kremlin and the White House deserve some praise for their speed in reaching this stage, since the first initiative on pushing for a new START to replace the current one that will expire on Dec. 5, 2009, was made at a brief acquaintance meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Obama at the sidelines of the London G20 Summit in April.
"Despite the unresolved differences on key issues between Moscow and Washington, both Russian and U.S. presidents have pledged to work more actively together to move their bilateral cooperation to a new level.”
A part of the reasons for reaching this tentative agreement so fast probably stems from the fact that Obama has deep, first-hand knowledge of both countries’ nuclear stockpiles, obtained not from the traditional regular briefings of presidents by top national security service staffs, but from his personal involvement in nuclear issues, as a member of the U.S. Commission monitoring the fulfillment of a bilateral agreement on U.S.-government-bankrolled liquidation of Russia’s out-of-use strategic nuclear arms. It was in this capacity that Obama first visited Russia in 2005.
Commenting on the new START agreement, Medvedev called it a ‘reasonable compromise,’ as the final nuclear stockpiles will still ensure the existing parity in both countries’ strategic nuclear capabilities. “These [figures] are the new parameters that we shape our future dialog and where we hope to achieve a final agreement that will be part of the new treaty,” he added. Equally satisfied with the preliminary START deal, Obama noted that without such agreements on readiness to effectively manage and reduce their own nuclear stockpiles, both Russia and the United States would find it difficult to show credible leadership on these issues on the global arena, where unregulated proliferation of nuclear weapons and related technologies has become a major problem. “This [leadership] starts with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. As the world’s two leading nuclear powers, we must lead by example, and that's what we're doing here today.” Obama went further to propose holding a summit on nuclear issues later in the year in the United States to be attended by all interested parties to find solutions to the issue, while Moscow could host a similar conference in 2010.
Other key issues agreed on by both parties included, amongst others, boosting the existing level of bilateral cooperation in the nuclear field, provision of a transit corridor by Russia to U.S. military and non-military cargoes to Afghanistan and the creation of a Presidential Commission on Bilateral Cooperation. The new organ, a sort of an upgraded replicate of the now-defunct ‘Chernomyrdin-Gore Commission,’ will comprise 13 committees that will oversee and coordinate relations between the two countries’ various agencies in all priority areas of bilateral diplomacy, with special emphasis on economic and military spheres. However, the new commission will be more influential — both in spheres and scope of jurisdiction as well as the overall management level, as it will, unlike the Chernomyrdin-Gore arrangement, be co-chaired by both presidents, rather U.S. Vice President Joe Baiden and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, a move that is aimed at giving the commission a new dimension.
Areas and issues of differences
Despite the obvious rapprochement between the young leaders born after WWII, the historical legacies of mutual mistrust, accusations and counteraccusations they have inherited in office are so great for them to resolve at their first official summit all the problems accumulated over decades that were further exacerbated over the last eight years by the former U.S. administration. Thus, it goes without saying that apart from the tentative framework agreement on the new START and a raft of joint statements of mutual understanding, lots of thorny issues of bi- and multilateral importance have remained unresolved.
This, first and foremost, included the wide disparity in the proposed number of warheads and their delivery vehicles, meaning that a consensus is still very far on this issue. The second thorny subject, where both parties are also at divergent poles, is the Washington’s ‘questionable plan’ to install its anti-ballistic missile (ABM) shield in Europe, specifically, in Poland and the Czech Republic, beginning tentatively from 2013. Here, Obama, trying to convince Kremlin to endorse the controversial project, borrowed a phrase from his predecessor’s rhetoric, saying the ABM is not directed against Russia, but at deterring probable nuclear threats from Iran and North Korea, long undiplomatically labeled by Washington as both ‘rogue states’ and ‘axis of evil.’
However, the Russian leadership has flatly rejected such arguments, calling them a pretext by Washington to boost and consolidate its nuclear capabilities at the expense of other nations. This is particularly more so, as a more comprehensive shield proposed by the Kremlin, which according to top Russian and foreign experts on ABM and nuclear threats, would have been much more effective against perceived threats — real/imagined — from the so-called rogue states, has received lukewarm reactions from Washington. Besides, the planned locations of these shields, at just a stone-thrown distance from the Russian borders, are also another reason behind Moscow’s comprehensive dismissal of Washington’s arguments. However, Obama’s promise to review the plan, bolstered by a pledge to address all Moscow’s concerns regarding the ABM issue, a new position that is radically different from George Bush’s unilateral approach on the issue, was largely seen Medvedev as a ‘breakthrough’ that will create ‘a more conducive diplomatic atmosphere’ for more productive negotiations on this topic.
“As the world’s two leading nuclear powers, the United States and Russia must lead others by example, and that's what we're doing here today in Moscow.”
Another issue that might later generate different interpretations in the Kremlin and the White House is one ambiguous clause in one of the joint statements of understanding that tightly links offensive with defensive security systems in search for solutions to issues of more sustainable global security. Russia is sure to translate this clause as ‘linking the eventual deployment of the ABM with the new START, in line with the Kremlin’s official view, offered by both Medvedev and Putin ahead of the summit. Similarly, the United States, which sees the ABM and START policies as totally different issues, will correspondingly translate the clause in a way that best suits its own national interests and geopolitical security agenda.
Here, Obama again tried to apply the well-known ‘stick-carrot’ diplomatic tactic, offering a discreet clue to the resolution of the AMB dilemma in a key program speech on U.S.-Russian relations at the New Economic School in Moscow, saying the disappearance of nuclear threats from Iran would make the planned deployments of the ABM in Europe redundant. In a layman’s words, Obama wants Russia to put on more pressure on recalcitrant Iran — currently striving against global community’s endorsement to obtain strategic offensive nuclear weapons and related dual-use technologies at all costs — to desist from its questionable ambitions.
Another issue that was brought by the United States, which was totally ‘of no interest’ to Russia, was Georgia’s territorial integrity and the inalienable rights of all sovereign nations, including the former Soviet states, notably, Georgia and Ukraine, to enter into and/or form any alliances with other countries and/or foreign organizations, including NATO, conditional only on the approvals of such aspirations by the majority of those countries’ populations secured via internationally recognized, free and fair democratic procedures. However, experts say the mentioning of these issues was merely Obama’s deference to a part of its U.S. and international audiences, rather than a real attempt to change Moscow’s hard stands on these issues. As an example, the experts cited the Georgian territory integrity issue, which to Moscow, after its recognition of the independence of Tbilisi’s breakaway republics last summer, is now deemed completely closed and not renegotiable on any grounds. 
Leaders remain upbeat, despite differences
Despite these and other differences on key issues, both Russian and U.S. presidents have pledged to work more actively together to move their countries’ mutually beneficial cooperation to a new and more productive level, while striving, without resorting to confrontations, for equally mutually acceptable compromises on all issues that still put the countries at divergence, on different sides of the isle.
Judging from the rapprochement established by both leaders at the official first meeting, one can say that the first time in years, both Russia and the United States are upbeat about their future relations. “We are not interested in military or in any other conflicts with Russia, but quite the contrary; we want to boost all spheres of our bilateral cooperation. This is not only in the U.S. interests, but also in the interests of Russia itself,” Obama noted. “This is why all issues and differences between us must be regulated for the interests of our countries, and the reason why I have called for a ‘reset’ of our relationships.”
Echoing his counterpart’s view, Medvedev specifically noted the obvious positive effects of the synergies from such pragmatic bilateral cooperation, as a joint Russian-U.S. leadership holds some keys to solutions to major global issues, where much-needed progress is currently elusive, starting from the Iranian nuclear program, North Korea’s increasingly erratic behavior in the Korean Peninsular to the eventual success of the ongoing war on global terrorism. “I would like to say that I view all the agreements reached today as a first, but very important step in the process of improving a full-scale cooperation between our countries for the benefit our nations,” he added. “This is why Russia would like to establish such a level of productive cooperation with the United States that will be worthy of the challenges of the 21st century and capable of ensuring more lasting international peace and global stability.”
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